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Abstract
Influential empirical work by Rauch and Trindade (REStat, 2002) finds that Chinese
ethnic networks of the magnitude observed in Southeast Asia increase bilateral trade by
at least 60%. We argue that this estimate is upward biased due to omitted variable bias.
Moreover, it is partly related to a preference effect rather than to enforcement and/or the
availability of information. Applying a theory-based gravity model to ethnicity data for 1980
and 1990, and focusing on pure network effects, we find that the Chinese network leads to a
more modest amount of trade creation of about 15%. Using new data on bilateral stocks of
migrants from the World Bank for the year of 2000, we extend the analysis to all potential
ethnic networks. We find, i.a., evidence for a Polish, a Turkish, a Mexican, or an Indian
network. While confirming the existence of a Chinese network, its trade creating potential
is dwarfed by other ethnic networks.
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1 Introduction
Simple static and dynamic neoclassical models predict that more liberal international mobility
of labor has the potential to unlock huge efficiency gains; see Moses and Letnes (2004) or Klein
and Ventura (2007). These effects derive from a more efficient allocation of the global work
force over countries. While hiding potentially important adverse effects in sending countries,
they also abstract from gains due to increased international integration of markets driven by
networks of migrants.
In an influential paper, Rauch and Trindade (2002) – henceforth R&T – use an empirical
trade flow model to show that the network formed by the overseas Chinese population has a
major trade creating effect. Quantitatively, they find that “for trade between countries with
ethnic Chinese population shares at the levels of prevailing in Southeast Asia, the smallest esti-
mated average increase in bilateral trade in differentiated products attributable to ethnic Chinese
networks is nearly 60% ” (p. 116). They argue that this effect is due to the reduced information
costs and improved contracting conditions that networks may bring about. Compared to other
determinants of bilateral trade, this effect is large. For example, R&T find that the pro-trade
effect of colonial ties is only 13.8%.
The paper by R&T is widely cited. In their survey article, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)
devote substantial space to the results of R&T and argue that the ad valorem tariff equivalent
of informational costs is about 6 percent. This is higher than the average tariff rate applied
worldwide in recent years.1 Using data for OECD countries, Evans (2003) argues that tariff
equivalents implied by R&T are exaggerated. Existing empirical work connected to R&T makes
use of a standard gravity framework. However, in the last years, the econometric modeling of
bilateral trade flows has improved due to a sequence of major innovations. Most importantly,
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) have derived a testable gravity equation from the standard
monopolistic competition trade model. They show that unbiased estimation of parameters
requires to take the so called multilateral resistance terms into account: how strongly trade
impediments between two countries reduce their bilateral trade depends crucially on the strength
1The WTO World Trade Report (2007) documents that for the US, Canada, and the majority of European
countries, the import-weighted average applied tariff rate was 4.1 percent in 2005.
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of impediments between each of these two countries with all the other countries that they trade
with. This argument is clearly important when quantifying the quantitative importance of
ethnic networks: how strongly such a network between two countries encourages bilateral trade
depends on the costs of alternative trade routes that these two countries entertain.2
Besides potential omitted variable bias, the results of R&T may also suffer from misspecifica-
tion. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue and show empirically that log-linear specifications
of the gravity equation may lead to inconsistent estimates if the assumed error term does not
enter multiplicatively into the relationship. Liu (2008) emphasizes that this critique also applies
to Tobit estimation, the estimation technique used by R&T. One way to deal with this problem
is to estimate the gravity model by Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood, which robust is to the
type of misspecification mentioned above.3
As Combes et al. (2005) point out, ethnic networks may affect bilateral trade not only
through their effect on trade costs (information and contracting costs), but also through pref-
erences: members of ethnic minorities abroad may derive higher utility from goods imported
from countries that host their ethnic majority. It is therefore difficult to clearly disentangle the
trade cost from the preference effect.4 Separate identification, however, would be welcome, since
trade-cost savings from networks free up resources and therefore represent welfare-improving
efficiency improvements. The preference channel is not associated to such efficiency gains. The
existence of a measurable and sizable trade-cost effect would be another – hitherto neglected
– channel through which international migration leads to an improved allocation of resources
worldwide.
In this paper we offer three contributions. First, we discuss the identification of the trade-
cost channel of networks in a theory-based gravity model. We argue that, excluding the links of
ethnic minorities with the ethnic majority country, one may minimize the preference effect and
come closer to the pure trade cost effect. Second, we apply a modern approach to the data of
2Controlling for multilateral resistance is crucial, e.g., for the correct estimation of border effects – see the
discussion in Feenstra (2004) – and, hence, for dealing with the so called border puzzle (McCallum, 1995).
3Liu (2008) also shows that Poisson estimation helps addressing the puzzle raised by Rose (2004) that WTO
membership does not create trade.
4Felbermayr and Toubal (2008) is a first attempt to disentangle the trade costs and preference effects of
migrants on OECD bilateral trade.
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R&T. This avoids a number of problems related to the R&T approach; see Baldwin and Taglioni
(2006) for a discussion of those issues.5 Combining the first and the second point, we show that
the large trade-creating effect of 60% estimated by R&T is probably two to four times too large.
Most of the overestimation comes from the omission of the multilateral resistance terms; the
preference channel seems to be less important.
Finally, we extend the analysis beyond R&T. Using data from the World Bank for the year of
2000, we proxy ethnic networks by the stocks of foreign-born individuals. This gives us a more
narrow definition of ethnic networks, because only migration in a life-time can constitute an
overseas ethnic minority. However, applying R&T’s methodology, we find qualitatively similar
results than for the years of 1980 and 1990 with the broader definition of ethnicity. Moreover,
the World Bank allows to check for the existence of other ethnic (or better: migrant) networks.
Besides the Chinese network, we document the existence of an Indian, a Turkish, or a Mexican
network, to name only a few. Interestingly, in terms of trade-creating potential, the Chinese
network is by far not the most important one.
Our paper is related to the literature as follows. Besides the paper by R&T, which we
take as our starting point, our analysis is very close to Combes et al. (2005). That paper
studies the role of social and business networks constituted by inter-regional migrants in France.
Using a theory-based gravity approach, they find that these regional networks are quantitatively
important and that they may contribute toward an explanation of the border puzzle introduced
by McCallum (1995). Our paper is also related to a large literature on the direct effect of
migration on bilateral trade. Gould (1994), Head and Ries (1998), Girma and Yu (2000), and
Wagner et al. (2002) study the trade promoting role of immigration into the U.S. or Canada.
Dunlevy (2006) and Bandyopadhyay et al. (2008) document a pro-trade effect of migration on
the exports of US states. While the older literature usually focuses on bilateral trade of one
anchor country with many trade partners, Felbermayr and Jung (2008) extend the analysis to
the full matrix of sending and receiving countries and identify a strong causal effect of bilateral
migration on bilateral trade between Southern and Northern countries.
5Baldwin et al. (2008) document the quantitative importance of these problems in a study on the effect of the
Euro on trade and investment.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical
framework and discusses our econometric approach. Section 3 provides a detailed look at the
data. Section 4 and 5 contain our results while section 6 offers concluding remarks. The
Appendix further details regression results .6
2 Econometric specification
2.1 A theory-based gravity model
We assume the existence of representative household with CES preferences over domestic and
imported varieties of some differentiated good. Different to the standard treatment, we use
the utility function proposed in Combes et al. (2005) which introduces source-country specific
weights aij . These weights capture the particular attachment of country i′s household to im-
ports from country j. We may use this slightly modified utility function in the multi-country
monopolistic competition model of international trade proposed by Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003), henceforth A&vW. Utility maximization under the appropriate aggregate budget con-
straint, market clearing, and the assumption that iceberg trade costs Tij and preference weights
aij are symmetric (Tij = Tji; aij = aji) , the (c.i.f.) value of bilateral imports Mij can be written
as
Mij =
YiYj
Yw
(
Tij
aij
)1−σ (
P˜iP˜j
)σ−1
, (1)
where the price indices P˜ solve
(
P˜j
)1−σ
=
∑C
i=1 (Yi/Yw) (Tij/aij)
1−σ
(
P˜i
)σ−1
; see Feenstra
(2004) for the details of the derivation. A&vW call P˜i indices of multilateral resistance because
they depend on the trade costs of country i with all countries in the world, the number of
which is given by C. The variables Yi denote GDP of country i, the subindex w refers to
the world. The elasticity of substitution in the underlying CES utility function is given by
σ. We will be interested by the determinants of Tij in general, and by the cost of obtaining
information in particular. Following the literature, we assume that Tij is a log-linear function
of its determinants.
6Our data, program codes, and further results can be downloaded from
http://team.univ-paris1.fr/teamperso/toubal/papers/fjt08.7z
5
The central insight of A&vW is that the volume of trade between i and j depends not only
on the trade costs between i and j but on the entire distribution of trade costs between i and j
and all other countries of the world. How strongly Tij restricts trade between i and j depends
on the costs that affect trade with alternative partners. Hence, in the estimation we have to
deal with the P˜i terms. We also have to decide about the appropriate econometric estimation
technique. Finally, in order to make the role of networks explicit, we need to model Tij and aij .
We deal with the first two issues first and relegate the modeling of trade costs and preferences
into section 2.2.
The multilateral resistance terms P˜i are essentially unobserved since they do not correspond
to official CPI deflators. A&vW show how one can solve for the P˜i terms numerically and
use them in an iterative estimation strategy. They demonstrate that the failure to control
for multilateral resistance typically biases the absolute value of estimated trade cost variables
upwards. R&T recognize the problem of multilateral resistance (without mentioning the issue)
by adding an ad-hoc remoteness term to their regressions. Ex ante, it is unclear whether this
is sufficient to deal with omitted variable bias. In our regressions, we follow Feenstra (2004)
who argues that the use of importer and exporter specific fixed effects in a simple OLS model
leads to very similar results than A&vW’s strategy but is technically much less demanding. We
opt for this strategy, which is now common in virtually all gravity applications. In order to
save on degrees of freedom, we do not allow for separate role for importer and exporter fixed
effects; rather, we will use country dummies which, nevertheless, fully control for all purely
country-specific variables such as the P˜i terms; see Baier and Bergstrand (2007) for a similar
strategy.7
Traditionally, the gravity literature estimates a log-linear version of (1). In non-stochastic
form, the relationship between the multiplicative constant-elasticity model (1) and its log-linear
additive formulation is trivial. This does no longer hold if trade flows are measured with er-
ror. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) warn that heteroskedastic residuals do not only lead to
inefficiency of the log-linear estimator, but also cause inconsistency. This is because of Jensen’s
7R&T do not overtly address the issue of multilateral resistance. They implicitly deal with it in an ad hoc
way by introducing a variable called remoteness.
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inequality which says that the expected value of the logarithm of a random variable is different
from the logarithm of its expected value, i.e., E(lnMij) 6= lnE(Mij). Then, E(lnMij) not
only depends on the mean of Mij , but also on higher moments of the distribution. Thus, het-
eroskedasticity in the residuals, which on a first glance only affects efficiency of the estimator,
feeds back into the conditional mean of the dependent variable, which, in general, violates the
zero conditional mean assumption on the error term needed to guarantee consistency.
To be more precise, consider that the true model can be represented as Mij = exp (βXij)+ij .
Then, estimating a log-linear model of the form ln(Mij) = βXij + ln(ηij) would imply that
ηij = 1 + ij/ exp(βXij). Hence, E[ηij |Xij ] can only be independent of Xij for the special case
ij = exp(βXij)νij , where νij is a random variable statistically independent of Xij . In general,
this requirement is violated.
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) solve these problems by estimating the gravity equation
multiplicatively (without taking the logarithm on Mij) and allowing for heteroskedasticity. Their
proposed estimator is equivalent to the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator (PML),
the most commonly used conditional mean specification of which is E (Mij |Xij ) = exp (βXij).
Coefficients can be explained as elasticities if the dependent variable is in level and covariates
Xij are in logs. It is worthy to note that country fixed effects can be included in the PML model
as a control for multilateral resistance terms.
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) justify the hypothesis that conditional variance is pro-
portional to the conditional mean for the Poisson model, although the Poisson regression is
consistent even when the variance function is misspecified.8
Liu (2008) argues that the problem of inconsistency due to heteroskedasticity also applies to
the Tobit estimator, which has been used by R&T. Moreover, they use the log of total bilateral
trade ln [(Mij +Mji) /2] as the dependent variable, which would be correct only if the theoretical
assumption of perfect symmetry in trade costs τij = τji was to be taken literally and the error
terms were symmetric, too.
8Using nonparametric tests, Henderson and Millimet (2008) recommend estimation of the gravity model in
levels. Wooldridge (2002, p.676) emphasizes “while the leading application is to count data, the fixed effect Poisson
estimator works whenever the conditional mean assumption holds. Therefore, the dependent variables could be a
nonnegative continuous variable, or even a binary response if we believe the unobserved effect is multiplicative...”.
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2.2 The role of networks
We now need to formalize the role of ethnic (or: migrants’) networks. While there is little doubt
that such networks may play an important role in conveying important information about the
trading opportunities between countries, there is no apparent consensus in the existing literature
as to how such networks are to be defined and modeled.
We define as the k-ethnic network the set of bilateral links between all countries in the world
maintained by members of the ethnicity k. In other words, there are as many ethnic networks
as there are ethnicities in the world. In our empirical work, we will assume that every ethnicity
is associated to exactly one country in the world.9 Moreover, most of our analysis concentrates
on the most sizable ethnic network studied by R&T: that of Chinese.
Figure 1: Direct and indirect links in a network of countries.
Figure 1 illustrates a stylized network of six countries. The single star in the left panel
depicts the Chinese ethnic network. It illustrates the links between the hub (China), illustrated
by a full black circle, and its spokes (other countries), depicted by hollow circles. Through the
hub, all spokes are linked with each other. The right-hand panel in Figure 1 depicts some of the
bilateral trade links between the six countries. The solid lines coincide with the ethnic network
which will affect trade relationships directly. We therefore use the term direct links. Bilateral
trade flows between spokes are illustrated by dashed lines. Since the ethnic network affects those
flows only through links to the same hub, we talk about indirect links. For simplicity, we assume
that each ethnic (or migrant) network is associated to a single hub, but this need not be so in
all cases. The strength of the link between any spoke i and the hub is measured by the share of
individuals with ethnicity k in the total resident population of spoke i, and denoted by sik.
9Obviously, the number of ethnicities is much larger than the number of independent countries since there are
many ethnicities without their own state, e.g., the Kurds. We abstract from this possibility.
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Clearly, ethnic networks can foster trade along the direct links. They also, however, poten-
tially affect trade between spokes i and j. This is the case, because migrants with ethnicity
k residing in spoke i convey information on trading opportunities with migrants of the same
ethnicity residing in spoke j, i.e., information about one country is made available through the
k-network. Indirect k-ethnic links between spokes are measured by Nkij = siksjk, for all i, j, k.
10
The k-ethnic network is then just the vector Nk that collects all elements Nkij for all i and j.
Following R&T, we assume that trade costs Tij are a function of geographical measures
related to transportation costs (distance, adjacency), of variables related to trade policy (mem-
bership in regional trade agreements), a variable measuring cultural proximity (common lan-
guage), and one related to historical ties (joint colonial past). Central to our analysis, Tij also
depends on the network variable defined above. We assume that the trade cost function can be
linearized. Collecting all variables other than the network into the (row) vector Xij , we may
therefore posit lnTij = ξ′TXij −
∑
k ν
k
TN
k
ij , where ξ is a vector of coefficients, N
k
ij measures the
strength of the k-ethnic network (CHINSHARE in R&T), and νkT is the associated coefficient
measuring the effect of the k-ethnic network on trade costs (expected to be positive). Evidence
in favor of νkT > 0 would suggest that the network lowers informational or contractual costs,
thereby encouraging trade through lower total trade costs. This is the trade cost channel of
networks which R&T focus on in their paper.
Similarly, we may posit that country i′s cultural, political, or geographical proximity to
country j increases the weight of goods imported from i, so that ln aij = ξ′aXij +
∑
k ν
k
aN
k
ij ,
where νka is expected positive. Evidence for ν
k
a > 0 would be in line with the existence of a
preference effect of ethnic networks.
Employing these specifications for Tij and aij in (1), and using non-overlapping sets of
country dummies µi and µj to control for all country-specific variables, we have
Mij = exp
{
ln (YiYj) + (σ − 1)
(
ξ′a − ξ′T
)
Xij +
∑
k
(σ − 1)
(
νka + ν
k
T
)
Nkij + µi + µj
}
+ ij ,
= exp
{
ln (YiYj) + ξ¯′Xij +
∑
k
ν¯kNkij + µi + µj
}
+ ij . (2)
10Note that Nkij ≤ Nkkj , j, i 6= k.
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Clearly, the estimated coefficients ξ¯′ and ν¯k will reflect the elasticity of substitution σ as well as
the effect of X or the network on trade costs and preferences. In other words, there is a twofold
identification problem. First, the identification of the total network effect is impossible without
external information about σ. Second, the trade cost and the preference channels are typically
confounded.
At this point, we want to make two observations. First, R&T run equation (2) on different
dependent variables: trade in differentiated goods, trade in reference-price goods, and trade in
exchange-traded goods. This classification being directly related to the degree of substitutability
σ, there are no clear predictions concerning the comparison between parameter estimates ξ¯′
and ν¯k obtained from these different regressions. For example, even if the trade cost and the
preference channel could be separated, for a given strength of the network effect νkT , the estimated
coefficient (σ − 1) νkT would be large for homogeneous goods since the degree of substitutability
is high and low for differentiated goods. The opposite may be true if, for given σ, νkT varies
across the groups of goods. However, neither σ nor νkT can be assumed constant over those
subaggregates of goods so that the naive comparison of coefficients obtained from different
regressions is problematic.
Second, in general, any estimate of ν¯k reflects the preference and trade cost effect of the k-
ethnic network.11 However, the following observation may help in the separate identification of
the channels. Any ethnic (or migrant) network consists of direct and indirect links. Direct links
are those that relate an individual of ethnicity k residing in country i to another individual of
the same ethnicity at the hub, namely country k. Indirect links, in turn, relate the individual to
another one of the same ethnicity in country j 6= k. If migrants (or their offspring) have special
preferences for goods produced in country k, then direct links will reflect the preference channel
along with information channel. The preference channel should, however, not be so important
11R&T conceptually decompose the trade cost channel into an ‘contractual enforcement’ and an ‘informational’
component. They try to isolate the informational part by distinguishing between differentiated, reference-priced
and exchange-traded goods. Their identifying assumption is that network improve contractual enforcement for
all categories of goods, but information is only relevant for differentiated goods. Hence, the difference between
the network estimates for differentiated and exchange-traded goods reflects information; see also Anderson and
van Wincoop (2004). We do not wish to push this interpretation, since equation (2) shows that estimated
coefficients would also reflect systematic differences in elasticities of substitution across categories of goods, which
are essentially unobserved. Rather, we subsume both effects under ‘trade costs’.
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in indirect links, since these do not relate to the country of origin. Rather, indirect links should
only reflect the information channel.12
There is another advantage of looking at indirect links: it may well be that citizens of
country k move to country i (and vice versa) as a response to some positive shock to the trading
potential between the two countries. Then, the direct ethnic link sikski would be endogenous to
the volume of bilateral trade. In contrast, the indirect links sikskj would not be affected.13
Summarizing, our econometric approach differs from R&T in the following ways:
1. In all of our specifications, the dependent variable is the log (or level, depending on the
model) of imports rather than the log (or level) of the arithmetic average over imports
and exports. This implies that we have two observations per country pair instead of only
one. This increases the degrees of freedom, but requires to control for correlation of error
terms within each pair.
2. We control for the multilateral resistance terms and all other country-specific determinants
of trade costs, policy, history, etc., by including a complete set of country fixed-effects. This
strategy also mitigates spurious correlation concerns driven, e.g., by language etc..
3. Our preferred specification is a Poisson (pseudo) maximum likelihood approach with coun-
try fixed-effects.
4. Since the comparison of results by commodity group is complicated by a (potentially)
varying degree of substitutability, we also show results for aggregate trade,
5. Besides computing the total network effect, as R&T do, we present direct and indirect
effects for the case of measuring the strength of network in shares, where the latter are
supposed to be more informative about the pure trade cost channel.
12R&T propose a similar strategy in a section where they measure the strength of networks in levels rather
Chinese ethnic population shares.
13Clearly, any combinations of sik, sjk, ski, skj would satisfy this criterion.
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3 Data
3.1 Trade data
R&T estimate the effect of Chinese ethnic networks on different dependent variables: trade
in differentiated goods, trade in reference-priced goods, and trade in exchange-traded goods.
This classification requires trade data at the level of the four-digit Standard Industrial Trade
Classification (SITC) Revision 2, which can be downloaded from the United Nations Commodity
Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade).
Since the raw data are incomplete in time, country, and commodity coverage, several at-
tempts have been made to recompile the data, thereby allocating exports to unspecified regions,
and correcting for entrepoˆt trade. The correct identification of trading partners seems to be an
important issue, which is also recognized by R&T.
Statistics Canada has constructed the World Trade Database (WTDB), covering the years
1970-1997. Feenstra (2000) concludes that the “method of dealing with entrepoˆt trade seems to
be adaptable to the situation of an entrepoˆt country as the Netherlands. [...]. It does not seem
to cover the case of entrepoˆt trade countries such as Hong Kong or Singapore” (p. 4). In order
to assess the severity of the problem, Feenstra (2000) compares the total value of U.S. imports
from China and Hong Kong, respectively, from Statistics Canada and U.S. Census data, and
finds these values to be “reasonably close” (p. 7) up until 1983.
R&T have made use of an early version of the WTDB. Unfortunately, this data is no longer
distributed by the NBER. A slightly revised version covering the years 1980-1997 is made avail-
able by Robert Feenstra, and can be downloaded as UCD-Statistics Canada Trade Data. The
data differ from those used by R&T, because they do not contain zero trade flows. Rather, trade
flows below 1,000 thousand U.S. dollar are coded as missing.
Robert Feenstra also provides a newer dataset (NBER-UN World Trade Data), covering the
years 1962-2000. Data for early years (1962-1983) are taken from UN Comtrade, making adjust-
ments for country codes only. For the latter years (1984-2000), data only cover 72 countries, and
are adjusted in several ways. Most importantly, Feenstra et al. (2005) revise Chinese exports
12
shipped through Hong Kong.14
In order to take advantage of all the corrections made, we utilize the UCD-Statistics Canada
Trade Data for 1980, and the NBER-UN World Trade Data for 1990 and 2000. We restrict
our sample to the 63 countries used by R&T. Unfortunately, the 72 reporting countries in the
NBER-UN World Trade Data do not completely overlap the 63 countries of interest, such that
we do not have the full trade flow matrix.15
3.2 Migration data
Data on Chinese ethnic networks for 1980 and 1990 is taken from R&T. In order to check the
existence of migrant networks, we utilize the World Bank international bilateral migration stock
database which is available for 226 countries and territories and is described in detail by Parsons
et al. (2007). Rather than including all persons with any Chinese ancestry, the World Bank
data comprise migrants which have been born in China and now reside in a foreign country.
While the migration data are broken down by receiving country, the data make no reference to
the time at which migration has taken place (Parsons et al., 2007, p. 4). It allocates the total
outstanding stock of 175.7 million international migrants over sending and receiving countries.
Both the Chinese ethnic and the migration network cover Chinese citizens residing abroad
and naturalized citizens of Chinese descent. Whereas the Chinese ethnic network also captures
descendants of Chinese parents, people born who have just been born in China without being
of Chinese ancestry add to the Chinese migrant network. In any case, the focus of the migrant
network is on people who have moved during their lifetime.16
14Feenstra et al. (2005) estimate the value-added in Hong Kong on re-exports, and reduce the value of imports
from China and increase the value of imports from Hong Kong by this amount. The markup calculation is
described in detail in Feenstra et al. (1999), and discussed in Feenstra et al. (2005).
15Countries and data availability are listed in the Appendix. In order to come from trade data on four-digit SITC
level to trade by commodity group, we make use of the Rauch (1999) classification. In order to save space, we focus
on the ‘liberal’ aggregation which maximizes the number of SITC categories classified as either exchange-trade
or reference-priced goods in case of ambiguities. R&T compare results for ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ aggregation
rules and find no qualitative and quantitative difference.
16This criterion is often not met in case of the Former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, where
the break-ups of former states have “produced” migrants. However, our analysis does not cover these countries.
Moreover, Parsons et. al (2007) states that “the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 did not
reduce the number of migrants” (p. 9).
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The World Bank matrix also allows for examining the role of other networks in a similar
way. In absolute values, Mexico is the top sending country with more than 10.1 million of its
natives living abroad. However, 92.6% of emigrants go to neighboring countries. This ratio is
18.4% for India, the second largest sending country with about 9.0 million of its natives abroad,
42.2% for China (fourth largest expatriate population, 5.8 million), 6.2% for Turkey (10th largest
expatriate population, 3.0 million), or 13.2% for Morocco (12th largest expatriate population,
2.6 million).17
3.3 Other data
Data on population in 2000 and GDP come from the World Development Indicators (WDI).18
Data on geographical and cultural proximity like distance, use of a common official language,
colonial ties, and common colonizer are taken from the CEPII. Following R&T, we include
dummies for common membership in the EEC and EFTA for 1980 and 1990. In 2000, we
additionally control for common membership in NAFTA and MERCOSUR, which seem to be
the most important regional free trade agreements at that time.
4 Results
In this section, we present results for the effect of Chinese networks on trade. The discussion
of other potential networks is relegated to the next section. Following R&T, we start with
looking at the effect of country pairs trading along the direct and indirect links. While this
strategy disallows to distinguish between preference and trade cost channel, we proceed with a
decomposition of the average effect. In order to make transparent how our estimation strategy
impacts on the trade creation of Chinese ethnic networks in Southeast Asia (where the network
is quantitatively strong), we also decompose the average effect along the lines of strong and weak
networks.
17This collection reflects the largest sending countries for which we find network effects in our empirical analysis
below.
18Unfortunately, WDI do not cover Taiwan which is therefore excluded from our analysis. It turns out that the
replication of R&T’s results does not hinge on the inclusion of Taiwan.
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We do not only present the estimated coefficients, but also compute implied trade creation
and associated ad valorem tariff equivalents. We do this in order to make our results comparable
to the results presented by R&T and A&vW, respectively.
4.1 The direct and indirect effect of the Chinese network on aggregate bilat-
eral trade
We start the discussion of our results by looking at aggregate bilateral trade. Hence, the depen-
dent variable records the total value of imports of country i from country j. In later tables, we
will disaggregate bilateral trade flows into the groups of exchange-trade, reference-priced, and
differentiated goods, as proposed by R&T.
The first three columns in Table 1, (A1) to (A3), show the effect of the Chinese ethnic network
on the value of bilateral trade, without distinguishing between direct and indirect network links.
The list of controls is identical to R&T. This implies that we also use the product of per capita
GDPs, despite the fact that the standard theoretical derivations of the gravity equation do
not allow any role for this variable.19 Column (A1) replicates R&T for the case of aggregate
trade and the year of 1980. The coefficients on standard gravity covariates appear with signs
and magnitudes comparable to those found by R&T and other studies: the coefficients on the
product of GDPs and distance are close to -1 and 1, respectively. The dummies controlling for
common membership in regional trade agreements (EEC, EFTA) yield implausible results (this
is common, see Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). Common language and colonial ties have large
and significant effects, and the adjacency dummy is not statistically significant.
19With non-homothetic preferences, there would be a natural role for per capita income in gravity equations.
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The variable of interest is CHIN. The coefficient obtained under OLS without fixed effects
in column (A1) yields a point estimate of 4.589 and a robust, cluster-corrected, t-value of more
than 7, which is comparable to results for trade by commodity group reported by R&T.20 That
effect amounts to total trade creation of about 1.5%, if assuming that CHIN moves from zero
to the sample average.21 In terms of ad valorem tariff equivalents, the estimated network effect
is equivalent to a hypothetical tariff reduction of about 0.2 percentage points.22 This is much
smaller than the headline result of 60% trade creation or, equivalently, 6% tariff equivalent,
discussed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), which focus on differentiated goods, and relate
to the effect of the network when both concerned countries have large (i.e., larger than 1%)
ethnic chinese populations. Table 9 columns (A1) and (B1) replicate the findings by R&T.
Column (A2) includes country-specific fixed effects to deal with multilateral resistance. This
changes the usual gravity covariates only modestly, with the exception of common EEC mem-
bership and colonial ties. In sharp contrast, the network effect drops to 0.853 and is only about
19% as big as the one obtained without fixed effects. Statistical significance, however, is main-
tained, with a t-value of 2.45. The amount of trade creation or the tariff equivalents are scaled
downwards to 0.3% and 0.04%, respectively.23 Finally, column (A3) replaces OLS estimation
with Poisson (pseudo) maximum likelihood (PML). Compared to (A2), the heteroskedasticity-
robust approach does not lead to important further changes and has only minor effects on the
accuracy of the estimate.
Columns (A4) and (A5) decompose the total network into direct (involving mainland China)
and indirect links (not involving China as a trade partner). The dummy variable DIR takes the
value of one if the bilateral relationship involves China and zero otherwise. Using fixed-effects in
an OLS model, the direct effect comes with an estimate of 0.747 and the indirect one with 1.062,
both estimated at satisfactory (though not excellent) statistical precision. Using the fixed-effects
20As R&T point out, the Tobit and OLS without fixed effects yield qualitatively and quantitatively comparable
results.
21The formula employed is 100 × [exp (ν¯ × CHIN)− 1] , where ν¯ is the obtained coefficient and CHIN the
sample mean; see R&T. Summary statistics are shown in the Appendix.
22The formula employed is 100×ν¯×[exp (CHIN)− 1] / (σ − 1). We use the same assumption on σ as Anderson
and van Wincoop (2004), i.e. σ = 8.
23This is less than 19% smaller due to the non-linearity of the trade cost function.
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PML model, we do not find any evidence for the indirect effect any more. This finding suggests
that the preference channel is probably quantitatively more important than the information
channel. However, also the preference channel is associated to a fairly modest amount of trade
creation (0.35%) and equivalent to a small tariff (0.05%).
Columns entitled (B1) to (B5) repeat the exercise for the year of 1990. The sample composi-
tion and the total number of observations is different, but the estimated coefficients are mostly
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those obtained for 1980. However, looking at our
preferred specifications (B3) and (B5), we find a larger role for the Chinese network. The total
effect now amounts to trade creation of 0.5% and to a tariff equivalent of 0.07% (both about
70% larger than in 1980). This effect is virtually entirely driven by the direct effect. The overall
conclusions from 1980 remain robust: the network effect is dramatically reduced when using
fixed effects, its economic significance is small, and the total effect is mostly driven by the direct
effect.
The remainder of the table turns to the year 2000 where we use data on bilateral stocks of
foreign born individuals rather than on ethnic populations. The network variable, constructed
as the product of shares in each of the two trading countries’ populations, is smaller than for
ethnic populations since the concept of foreign-born status is more narrow than that of ethnicity.
It is therefore not surprising that the estimated network coefficients are larger. However, when
evaluated at the sample mean, the associated amounts of trade creation or the tariff equivalents
are again small. The total effect yields trade creation of 0.1% (column C3) with marginal
statistical significance. There is no evidence for an indirect effect, and the direct effect, though
statistically significant, is small. Note that the estimated coefficient of the indirect effect obtained
under FE-OLS (C4) is huge (102.5). That number, together with the estimated for the direct
effect, is not plausible, since it opens an interval that does not encompass the average (total)
effect found in column (C2). We may conclude that it is crucial to use the PML strategy
since the bias due to potential misspecification of the error structure can be large. However,
it is qualitatively not important whether ethnic networks are measured using data on overseas
ethnic populations (as for years 1980 and 1990), or on populations of foreign born individuals.
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4.2 The Chinese network by commodity group
In Table 2, we present the trade creation and tariff equivalent results and the significance level
of the associated coefficients for different product categories. We only report the estimation
results from the FE-OLS and FE-PML specifications.24
The upper third of the table refers to the group of exchange-traded goods; the second to
the group of reference-priced goods; and the third to differentiated goods. It is natural to
suppose that the underlying degrees of substitutability differ in those groups. Since exchange-
traded goods are show-cases for homogeneous goods such as steel, corn, or ore, the elasticity of
substitution can be expected to be much larger than in the group of differentiated goods. These
differences are taken into account when computing the ad valorem tariff equivalents associated
to each network coefficient.
According to R&T, one may expect that the network effect should be largest for com-
modity goods, smaller for reference-priced goods, and minimum for goods traded on organized
exchanges. This conjecture does no longer generally hold true when the gravity equation is
estimated in a theory-consistent way by including fixed-effects. In columns (A1) and (B1),
exchange-traded goods yield the largest trade-creation effects and tariff equivalents.25 It is,
therefore, no longer meaningful to draw on the comparison of the coefficients obtained with
different trade categories using the R&T network variable to disentangle the respective roles of
the information and contract-enforcement channels as R&T propose to do.
The intuition that migrants convey trade-relevant information on differentiated goods that
are not already captured by the price system bears nicely out in column (C1). The network
variable in this column is different from the one used by R&T. We are studying the network
effect of China-born residents living overseas in 2000. In terms of economic magnitudes, trade
24Trade creation effects and tariff equivalents correspond to columns (A3)-(A5), (B3)-(B5) and (C3)-(C5) of
Table 7 in Appendix B. Notice that the results in Table 7 confirms the pattern that OLS without fixed effects
typically overestimates the size of the network effect. Interestingly, this problem is particularly severe in the case
of differentiated goods where the mere inclusion of these effects cuts the estimate by at least the factor 5 (and
makes it disappear in the year 1990); compare columns (A1) and (A2) of Table 7 in Appendix B. Using Poisson
has little quantitative effect on the obtained estimates but can have a strong effect on the precision. Similar
observations can be made regarding the years 1990 and 2000.
25It follows from Table 7 in Appendix B, columns (A3) and (B3), that also the points estimates are largest for
exchange-traded goods.
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Table 2: The Chinese network in different commodity groups
           1980              1990              2000      
(A1)  (A2)  (A3)  (B1)  (B2)  (B3)  (C1)  (C2)  (C3) 
FE‐PML    FE‐OLS    FE‐PML  FE‐PML    FE‐OLS    FE‐PML  FE‐PML   FE‐OLS    FE‐PML
Exchange‐traded goods 
Trade Creation (%) 
    CHIN  0.935***  0.763***  0.0860 
    CHIN*(1‐DIR)  0.791***  0.939**  0.682***  0.835**  2.893  3.876 
    CHIN*DIR  1.076***  0.934***  1.025***  0.753***  0.109***  0.103 
Tariff Equivalent (%) 
    CHIN  0.0491***  0.0401*** 0.00453
    CHIN*(1‐DIR)  0.0416*** 0.0493**  0.0358*** 0.0438**  0.150  0.200 
    CHIN*DIR          0.0565***   0.0490***        0.0538***   0.0538***        0.00573***   0.00544
Reference‐priced goods 
Trade Creation (%) 
    CHIN  0.390***  0.326**  0.0500 
    CHIN*(1‐DIR)  0.931***  0.127  0.584***  ‐0.201  4.182***  1.575 
    CHIN*DIR  0.605**  0.427**  0.503**  0.416***  0.0654***  0.0579 
Tariff Equivalent (%) 
    CHIN  0.0278***  0.0233**  0.00357
    CHIN*(1‐DIR)  0.0663*** 0.0091  0.0416*** 0.0144  0.293***  0.112 
    CHIN*DIR          0.0432**    0.0305**         0.0359**    0.0297***        0.00467***   0.00413
Differentiated goods 
Trade Creation (%) 
    CHIN  0.265  0.590***  0.124* 
    CHIN*(1‐DIR)  0.314*  0.0330  0.260**  0.104  1.626  1.137 
    CHIN*DIR  0.156  0.340**  0.282  0.656***  0.0676***  0.128* 
Tariff Equivalent (%) 
    CHIN  0.0523  0.147***  0.0310*
    CHIN*(1‐DIR)  0.0784*  0.00827  0.0649**  0.0260  0.403  0.283 
    CHIN*DIR          0.0390    0.0850**         0.0706    0.164***         0.0169***    0.0319*
N=2114, N=2127, N=2377 in 1980 for exchange‐traded goods, referenced‐priced goods and differentiated goods; N=2372, N=2377, N=2533 in 1990 
and N=2741, N=2914, N=3025 in 2000, respectively. All regressions inlcude the full list of covariates as shown in Table 1, and a constant (all omitted). 
FE‐OLS and FE‐PML include country dummies. Observation clustered by (undirectional) country‐pair. *, **, ***, indicate significance of the coefficient 
at the 1\%, 5\% and 10\% level, respectively. Trade creation and ad valorem tariff equivalent at the respective sample means. Elasticity of 
substitution is 20, 15, and 5 for exchange‐traded goods, referenced‐priced goods and differentiated good, respectively. 
 
creation and tariff equivalents for the group of differentiated goods are comparable to the ones
obtained for aggregate trade.
Finally, we distinguish again between direct and indirect network effects, see columns (A2),
(A3), (B2), (B3), (C2), and (C3). Across all categories of goods, the FE-OLS tend to yield
more statistically significant results than Poisson. Also, the trade-creation effects and tariff
equivalents are often smallest for differentiated goods and largest for exchange-traded ones,
with the exception of the estimates for the year 2000 (with a more narrow definition of the
network). In the latter case, we find convincing evidence only for the direct effect, but not for
the indirect one. Moreover, in all cases, the trade creation effects are small and never exceed
1%.
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Table 3: Strong versus weak network links: Ethnic Chinese and aggregate trade
         1980              1990               2000       
(A1)  (A2)  (A3)  (B1)  (B2)  (B3)  (C1)  (C2)  (C3) 
FE‐PML     FE‐OLS    FE‐PML  FE‐PML    FE‐OLS     FE‐PML 
FE‐
PML    FE‐OLS    FE‐PML 
Trade Creation (%) 
     CHIN*(1‐L)  0.817  1.334*** ‐0.148
     CHIN*(L)  14.68***  28.79*** 3.190 
     CHIN*(1‐L)*(1‐DIR)  1.057  1.340**  1.310** 1.300**  4.455**  0.677 
     CHIN*(1‐L)*DIR  ‐1.890  ‐0.528  0.0146  1.199*  ‐1.055*** ‐0.136 
     CHIN*L*(1‐DIR)  14.84*** 12.84**  14.59  12.71**  274.2***  70.63* 
     CHIN*L*DIR  6.975  14.82*** 18.17** 31.25*** 1.947*  3.727* 
Tariff Equivalent (%) 
     CHIN*(1‐L)  0.116  0.189*** 0.0212
     CHIN*(L)  2.064***  3.816*** 0.451 
     CHIN*(1‐L)*(1‐DIR)  0.150  0.190**  0.186** 0.185**  0.623**  0.0964 
     CHIN*(1‐L)*DIR  ‐0.273  ‐0.0756  0.00209 0.170*  ‐0.151***  ‐0.0194 
     CHIN*L*(1‐DIR)  2.085*** 1.834**  2.054  1.804**  18.95***  7.672* 
     CHIN*L*DIR        1.016    2.083***        2.518**    4.102***        0.277*     0.525* 
N=2520 in 1980, N=2975 in 1990, N=3253 in 2000. All regressions inlcude the full list of covariates as shown in Table 1, and a constant 
(all omitted). FE‐OLS and FE‐PML include country dummies. Observation clustered by (undirectional) country‐pair. *, **, ***, indicate 
significance at the 1    , 5     and 10     level, respectively. Trade creation and ad valorem tariff equivalent at the respective sample means. 
Elasticity of substitution is 20, 15, and 5 for exchange‐traded goods, referenced‐priced goods and differentiated good, respectively. 
 
4.3 Strong versus weak network links: Ethnic Chinese and aggregate trade
Next, Table 3 replicates the key findings of R&T for aggregate trade; results for different cat-
egories follow in Table 4. To do so, we distinguish between strong and weak network links.
Strong link are defined as those for which in both trading countries the share of ethnic Chinese
exceeds 1% of the population. Weak links are made up by the complementary set. We define by
L a dummy that takes the value of 1 in the former case and zero in the latter. We may further
distinguish between direct and indirect effects as in Tables 1 and 2.26
In Table 3, we augment the R&T standard specification by country specific fixed-effects. In
this theory-consistent estimation, strong network links increase trade in 1990 by at most 29%
with a tariff equivalent of at most 3.8%; for the years of 1980 and 2000, the effects are smaller
or non-existent. Weak networks perform worse.
Compared to the R&T results, we find much smaller network effects when estimated in a
theory-consistent framework. However, with aggregate bilateral trade as the dependent variable,
26The estimated coefficients are presented in columns (A3)-(A5), (B3)-(B5) and (C3)-(C5) of Table 8 in Ap-
pendix B.
21
there is evidence for a substantial and significant effect when focusing on strong links and the
broadly defined ethnic network. In 2000, where the more narrow criterion of China-born is used
to constitute the foreign Chinese network, we do not find any evidence for a Chinese network
anymore, regardless of the intensity of links. This is striking; compare to column (C3) in Table
1 where we have found a (marginally) significant average network effect. The reason for this
apparent inconsistency may lie in the lack of linearity in the network effect, so that the effects of
weak and strong links estimated in Table 3 do not average up to the total effect found in Table
1.
Table 3 further decomposes the network effects into direct and indirect ones. Across all
specifications, we find positive effects for the strong network and for both direct and indirect
links. Considering the non-linear estimation strategy FE-PML, we find large trade creation
effects and associated tariff equivalents for direct and strong links, ranging from 13 to 71% and
from 1.8 to 7.7%, respectively. Interestingly, the more narrowly defined migrant network yields
stronger effects than the broader ethnic network.
4.4 Strong versus weak network links: Ethnic Chinese in different commodity
groups
The final step, presented in Table 4, looks separately at different categories of goods, but oth-
erwise replicates Table 3.27
Neither the ranking of estimates across categories of goods nor their absolute magnitudes
are robust to the inclusion of country-fixed effects, neither in 1980 or in 1990. Drawing on the
preferred estimates (FE-PML), we find that increasing the size of the network from zero to the
sample mean for strong links yields trade creation of about 14% for differentiated goods and
a tariff equivalent of 3.4%. Trade creation is larger for exchange-traded goods, but the tariff
27The estimated coefficients are presented in columns (A3)-(A5), (B3)-(B5) and (C3)-(C5) of Table 9 in Ap-
pendix B. Notice that the results presented in columns (A1), (B1) of Table 9 in Appendix B are comparable with
R&T. In the OLS specification, we find the intuitive ranking of coefficients across differentiated, exchange-traded,
and reference-priced goods. For differentiated goods, we find the headline trade creation of almost 65% that R&T
report in the abstract of their paper. The associated tariff equivalent is higher (13%) than the one computed
by Anderson van Wincoop (2004) using the results and data of R&T because we are using a lower elasticity of
substitution (5 instead of 8).
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equivalent is lower due to a higher assumed elasticity of substitution (20) for the latter category
of goods.
We may now summarize the main results obtained from a theory-consistent view on the
trade flow implications of the Chinese ethnic network.
1. Controlling for multilateral resistance is important. Without doing so, the quan-
titative importance of the Chinese ethnic network is overestimated, at least by a factor of
two. The omitted variable bias is therefore positive, which signals a positive correlation
between the degree of multilateral remoteness of both the importer and the exporter and
the size of the Chinese network. Besides controlling for the unobserved resistance terms,
our fixed-effects estimation also deals with other country-specific and time-invariant de-
terminants of bilateral trade that may correlate with the size of the network. The overall
stance of policies toward the rest of the world (e.g., overall trade policy, overall restrictions
to migration, etc.) is such a candidate determinant.
2. Poisson estimation (PML) is immune to misspecification of the error term in the empirical
form of the gravity equation. It turns out that point estimators of the network coeffi-
cients are usually not strongly affected by misspecification bias. However, in several cases
the PML affects the estimated standard errors. Usually, PML makes results more
plausible; however, it also makes it more difficult to find robust network effects.
3. Direct network links amount to almost all the trade creation due to ethnic net-
works. Indirect links are rarely statistically and economically significant. One way to
interpret this result is that the preference channel of ethnic networks dominates the trade
cost channel. There is also evidence in favor of threshold effects in the sense that network
links need to be strong enough to be visible in the data and to matter economically.
4. We do not find overwhelming empirical support for an intuitive ranking of estimated
network effects across different categories of goods. Put differently, while we find evidence
for a Chinese network effect in aggregate data and for exchange-traded goods, we do
not find it for differentiated goods, where the effect is supposed to be strongest. This
sheds doubts on the overall usefulness of R&Ts identification strategy which
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Table 4: Strong versus weak network links: Ethnic Chinese in different commodity groups
   1980     1990   2000
(A1)  (A2)  (A3) (B1) (B2) (B3) (C1)  (C2) (C3)
FE‐PML  FE‐OLS  FE‐PML FE‐PML FE‐OLS FE‐PML FE‐PML  FE‐OLS FE‐PML
Exchange‐traded goods 
Trade Creation (%) 
     CHIN*(1‐L)  ‐0.359  ‐0.424 ‐1.098** 
     CHIN*(L)  28.77***  27.45*** 1.044 
     CHIN*(1‐L)*(1‐DIR)  0.951  1.200  0.631 ‐0.639 3.581 ‐0.482
     CHIN*(1‐L)*DIR  ‐0.137  ‐3.538** 0.834 ‐0.125 ‐0.435 ‐1.060*
     CHIN*L*(1‐DIR)  28.64***  39.64*** 28.05*** 29.35** 200.9 181.1
     CHIN*L*DIR  37.30***  26.72** 43.32*** 27.21*** 3.693** 1.922
Tariff Equivalent (%) 
     CHIN*(1‐L)  ‐0.0189  ‐0.0224 ‐0.0581 
     CHIN*(L)  1.405***  1.352 0.0549 
     CHIN*(1‐L)*(1‐DIR)  0.0498  0.0628 0.0331 ‐0.0337 0.185 ‐0.0254
     CHIN*(1‐L)*DIR  ‐0.00720  ‐0.190** 0.0437 ‐0.00658 ‐0.0229 ‐0.0561*
     CHIN*L*(1‐DIR)  1.399***  1.855*** 1.378*** 1.434** 5.829 5.469
     CHIN*L*DIR     1.761***  1.316** 2.005*** 1.341***   0.192** 0.101
Reference‐priced goods         
Trade Creation (%) 
     CHIN*(1‐L)  0.329  1.031** 0.717*** 
     CHIN*(L)  12.92**  17.01*** 2.214* 
     CHIN*(1‐L)*(1‐DIR)  2.982***  0.635  1.652*** 1.123* 6.455*** 3.820**
     CHIN*(1‐L)*DIR  0.655  ‐0.130 ‐0.263 0.472 ‐0.630* 0.692**
     CHIN*L*(1‐DIR)  39.66***  6.268  28.69*** ‐0.660 433.8*** 170.7**
     CHIN*L*DIR  23.11**  13.92** 21.41*** 19.69*** 2.785*** 4.158***
Tariff Equivalent (%) 
     CHIN*(1‐L)  0.0235  0.0733** 0.0511*** 
     CHIN*(L)  0.915**  1.189*** 0.157* 
     CHIN*(1‐L)*(1‐DIR)  0.210***  0.0452 0.117*** 0.0798* 0.447*** 0.268**
     CHIN*(1‐L)*DIR  0.0467  ‐0.00928 ‐0.0188 0.0336 ‐0.0451* 0.0493**
     CHIN*L*(1‐DIR)  2.517***  0.458  1.909*** ‐0.0501 12.03*** 7.149**
     CHIN*L*DIR     1.567**  0.982** 1.469*** 1.360***   0.197*** 0.292***
Differentiated goods      
Trade Creation (%) 
     CHIN*(1‐L)  1.180*  1.547** ‐0.297 
     CHIN*(L)  13.87**  33.21*** 2.687 
     CHIN*(1‐L)*(1‐DIR)  0.934*  1.435* 1.409*** 1.323* 3.876** 0.540
     CHIN*(1‐L)*DIR  ‐0.405  ‐0.0711 ‐0.530 1.780 ‐0.190 ‐0.366
     CHIN*L*(1‐DIR)  13.23  7.675  14.27 11.61 114.9** 54.05
     CHIN*L*DIR  5.634  14.81** 12.01 36.29*** 2.787*** 3.916
Tariff Equivalent (%) 
     CHIN*(1‐L)  0.293*  0.384** ‐0.0743 
     CHIN*(L)  3.428**  7.599*** 0.666 
     CHIN*(1‐L)*(1‐DIR)  0.232*  0.356* 0.350*** 0.329* 0.951** 0.135
     CHIN*(1‐L)*DIR  ‐0.102  ‐0.0178 ‐0.133 0.441 ‐0.0474 ‐0.0916
     CHIN*L*(1‐DIR)  3.280  1.951  3.535 2.910 19.23** 10.86
     CHIN*L*DIR  1.446  3.645** 3.006 8.203*** 0.691*** 0.965
N=2114,  N=2127,  N=2377  in  1980  for  exchange‐traded  goods,  referenced‐priced  goods,  and  differentiated  goods,  N=2372, 
N=2377, N=2533 in 1990, and N=2741, N=2914, N=3025 in 2000, respectively. All regressions include the full list of covariates as 
shown  in  Table  1,  and  a  constant  (all  omitted).  FE‐OLS  and  FE‐PML  include  country  dummies.  Observations  clustered  by 
(undirectional) country‐pair. Robust t statistics in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5%, and 
10%  level,  respectively.  Trade  creation  (%)  and  ad  valorem  tariff  equivalents  (%)  evaluated  at  the  respective  sample means. 
Elasticity of substitution is 20, 15 and 5 for exchange‐traded, reference‐priced, and differentiated goods, respectively. 
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distinguishes between the contract enforcement and the information channel of ethnic
networks.
5 Other migrant networks
R&T have studied the quantitative implications of the Chinese ethnic network in a traditional
gravity framework. We have qualified the picture using more recent econometric techniques. One
of the underlying assumptions of this work is that the Chinese network is the most influential
amongst the large number of potential other ethnic (or migrant) networks. In this section, we
look at a large number of potential networks and, using the same econometric setup than for
the Chinese network, test for their existence.
In particular, for any network k, we compute the tariff equivalent of increasing the size of the
network (the product of population shares siksjk of migrants in i and j coming from country k.
We focus on aggregate trade and on the total effect (without differentiating between strong and
weak and between direct and indirect links). For each network k, we run a separate regression.
Since we have information about the location of individuals born in country k only for the year
of 2000, all regressions refer to this year. Detailed results are found in Appendix C.
The upper part of Figure 2 represents the point estimates obtained for each network from
separate regressions as dark circles. It also plots the 1.96 standard deviations band around those
coefficients as dashed lines. All estimates shown are statistically significant at least at the 1%
level. The figure shows that the Chinese network is not at all the most important one in terms
of the trade cost reduction that it entails. The lower part of the figure, which records the total
sizes of emigrant networks in million individuals, shows that the Chinese network is also not the
largest one in terms of the emigrant population.
The most powerful network seems to be that of Moroccans, of whom about 2 million live
abroad. The associated tariff equivalent is close to 0.1%, which is, of course, still extremely
small compared to real-life tariffs, or to other estimated trade barriers (compare, e.g., to the
border effect identified in Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). The second and the third most
powerful networks are those of the Polish and the Ghanaese, respectively. The largest emigrant
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Figure 2: Tariff equivalents of different migrant networks (aggregate trade, total effects).
stock in the world is the Mexican one, with almost 10 million individuals. That network seems
to be relevant for trade creation, albeit at a tariff equivalent inferior to 0.05%. The second
largest sending country, India, is associated to an even weaker network, with a measurable yet
quantitatively negligible network effect.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have revisited the important work by Rauch and Trindade (R&T, 2002) on the
trade-enhancing role of Chinese ethnic networks. Those authors have found that for countries
with ethnic Chinese populations shares at the levels prevailing in Southeast Asia, the smallest
estimated average increase in bilateral trade in differentiated products attributable to ethnic
Chinese networks is nearly 60%. This estimate is obtained by the authors using a traditional
gravity model. Recent advances by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006) allow to estimate the network effect in a more theory-consistent and robust
way.
26
Using the econometric techniques proposed in the modern literature, we confirm the existence
of a Chinese network effect. However, in terms of magnitudes, the trade creation associated to
the network is at most half as big as the one computed by R&T. Moreover, we fail to find the
intuitive size ranking of network coefficients across differentiated, reference-priced, and exchange-
traded categories of goods. This is not overly surprising since the theory-based gravity model
signals that the estimated coefficients confound the elasticity of substitution with the trade-cost
elasticity of networks, so that comparing across categories of goods is not an ideal identification
strategy. Focusing on indirect network links (i.e., links that relate two trading partners other
than China) in order to mitigate endogeneity concerns and to reduce the role of preferences as
compared to information, we find that the average network effect is very small (and, indeed,
often indistinguishable from zero).
We also investigate other than the Chinese ethnic network. To do so, we use recent data on
bilateral stocks of foreign-born individuals provided by the World Bank for the year of 2000 and
a total of about 200 countries. Using this data, which implies a more narrow definition of an
ethnic network, we conduct a comprehensive quest for the existence of network effects in trade
data. Focusing on average effects, we document the existence of a large number of networks.
Judging by the obtained size of coefficients and the size of the involved emigrant population,
the most relevant are the Moroccan, the Polish, the Turkish, the Pakistan, the Mexican, the
British, the Chinese and the Indian networks. However, in all of these cases, the amount of
trade creation due to these networks is very small.
27
References
Anderson, J.E. and E. van Wincoop (2003). Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the
Border Puzzle. American Economic Review 93(1): 170-192.
Anderson, J.E. and E. van Wincoop (2004). Trade Costs. Journal of Economic Literature
42: 691–751.
Baier, S.L., and J.H. Bergstrand (2007). Do Free Trade Agreements Actually Increase
Members’ International Trade? Journal of International Economics 71: 72-95.
Baldwin, R.E., and D. Taglioni (2006). Gravity for Dummies and Dummies for Gravity
Equations. NBER Working Paper 12516.
Baldwin, R.E., V. DiNino, L. Fontagne´, R.A. De Santis and D. Taglioni (2008). Study on
the Impact of the Euro on Trade and Foreign Direct Investment. European Union,
Economic Papers 321.
Bandyopadhyay, S., C.C. Coughlin, and H.J Wall (2008). Ethnic Networks and US
Exports. Review of International Economics 16(1): 199-213.
Combes, P.-P., M. Lafourcade, and T. Mayer (2005). The Trade-Creating Effects of
Business and Social Networks: Evidence from France. Journal of International
Economics 66(1): 1-29.
Dunlevy, J.A. (2006). The Influence of Corruption and Language on the Protrade Effect
of Immigrants: Evidence from the American States. The Review of Economics and
Statistics 88(1): 182-186.
Evans, C.L. (2003). The Economic Significance of National Border Effects. American
Economic Review 93(4): 1291–312.
Feenstra, R.C. (2000). World Trade Flows, 1980-1997. University of California, Davis.
Feenstra, R.C. (2004). Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Feenstra, R.C., W. Hai, W.T. Woo, and S. Yao (1999). Discrepancies in International
Data: An Application to China-Hong Kong Entrep
Feenstra, R.C., R.E. Lipsey, H. Deng, A.C. Ma, and H. Mo (2005). World Trade Flows:
1962-2000. NBER Working Paper 11040.
Felbermayr, G., and B. Jung (2008). The Pro-Trade Effect of the Brain Drain: Sorting
Out Confounding Factors. Hohenheimer Diskussionsbeitra¨ge 302.
Felbermayr, G., and F. Toubal (2008). Revisiting the Trade-Migration Nexus : Evidence
from New OECD data. Mimeo Paris.
Girma, S., Yu, Z. (2000). The Link between Immigration and Trade: Evidence from the
UK. Review of World Economics, 138 (1).
28
Gould, D.M. (1994). Immigrant Links to the Home Country: Empirical Implication for
US Bilateral Trade Flows. Review of Economics and Statistics 68 (4): 811-848
Head, K., and J. Ries (1998) Immigration and Trade Creation: Econometric Evidence
from Canada. Canadian Journal of Economics 31 (1): 47-62.
Henderson, D.J., and D.L. Millimet (2006) Is Gravity Linear? Journal of Applied Econo-
metrics 23(2): 137-172.
Klein P., and G. Ventura (2007) TFP Differences and the Aggregate Effects of Labor
Mobility in the Long Run,” The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics : Vol. 7: Iss. 1
(Contributions), Article 10.
Liu, X (2008). GATT/WTO Promotes Trade Strongly: Sample Selection and Model
Specification. Review of International Economics. forthcoming.
McCallum, J. (1995). National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns.
The American Economic Review 85(3): 615-623.
Moses, J., and B. Letnes (2004). The Economic Costs to International Labor Restric-
tions: Revisiting the Empirical Discussion. World Development 32(10): 1609-1626.
Parsons, C.R., R. Skeldon, T.L. Walmsley, and L.A. Winters (2007). Quantifying In-
ternational Migration: A Database of Bilateral Migrant Stocks. World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 4165.
Rauch, J.E. (1999). Networks Versus Markets in International Trade. Journal of Inter-
national Economics 48: 7-35.
Rauch, J.E., and V. Trindade (2002). Ethnic Chinese Networks in International Trade.
Review of Economics and Statistics 84 (1): 116-130.
Santos Silva, J.M.C. and S. Tenreyro (2006). The Log of Gravity. Review of Economics
and Statistics, 88(4): 641-658.
Wagner, D., K. Head, and J. Ries (2002). Immigration and the Trade of Provinces.
Scottish Journal of Political Economy 49(5): 507-525.
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cam-
bridge: MIT Press.
29
Appendix
A List of countries and summary statistics
Table 5: List of countries included in the regressions
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Table 6: Summary statistics
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B Details to Chinese networks (Tables 2 to 4)
Table 7: The Chinese network in different commodity groups (Details to Table 2)
Dependent variable: Trade by commodity group
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5)
OLS FE‐OLS FE‐PML FE‐OLS FE‐PML OLS FE‐OLS FE‐PML FE‐OLS FE‐PML OLS FE‐OLS FE‐PML FE‐OLS FE‐PML
Exchange‐traded goods
CHIN 3.743*** 2.635*** 2.513*** 3.607*** 2.474*** 2.277*** 1.880* 2.272** 2.388
(6.86) (4.27) (3.23) (4.47) (5.17) (3.91) (1.85) (2.06) (1.40)
CHIN*(1‐DIR) 2.128*** 2.522** 2.034*** 2.490** 79.21 105.6
(3.17) (2.13) (3.34) (2.37) (0.93) (1.42)
CHIN*DIR 2.890*** 2.510*** 3.052*** 2.244*** 3.023*** 2.870
(3.88) (2.92) (6.24) (3.74) (2.61) (1.62)
Trade creation (%)
CHIN 1.396 0.981 0.935 1.212 0.830 0.763 0.0677 0.0819 0.0860
CHIN*(1‐DIR) 0.791 0.939 0.682 0.835 2.893 3.876
CHIN*DIR 1.076 0.934 1.025 0.753 0.109 0.103
Tariff equivalent (%)
CHIN 0.0731 0.0515 0.0491 0.0635 0.0436 0.0401 0.00356 0.00431 0.00453
CHIN*(1‐DIR) 0.0416 0.0493 0.0358 0.0438 0.150 0.200
CHIN*DIR 0.0565 0.0490 0.0538 0.0395 0.00573 0.00544
Reference‐priced goods
CHIN 3.318*** 1.930*** 1.054** 3.806*** 1.530*** 1.003** 4.863*** 1.513** 1.466
(9.78) (3.58) (2.21) (8.65) (3.62) (2.32) (3.48) (2.03) (1.25)
CHIN*(1‐DIR) 2.509*** 0.344 1.793*** ‐0.619 120.1*** 45.80
(4.09) (0.57) (3.58) (‐0.71) (2.85) (1.01)
CHIN*DIR 1.635** 1.153** 1.544** 1.278*** 1.916*** 1.696
(2.13) (2.39) (2.57) (3.36) (2.64) (1.37)
Trade creation (%)
CHIN 1.232 0.715 0.390 1.243 0.498 0.326 0.166 0.0516 0.0500
CHIN*(1‐DIR) 0.931 0.127 0.584 ‐0.201 4.182 1.575
CHIN*DIR 0.605 0.427 0.503 0.416 0.0654 0.0579
Tariff equivalent (%)
CHIN 0.0876 0.0510 0.0278 0.0884 0.0355 0.0233 0.0119 0.00369 0.00357
CHIN*(1‐DIR) 0.0663 0.00910 0.0416 0.0144 0.293 0.112
CHIN*DIR 0.0432 0.0305 0.0359 0.0297 0.00467 0.00413
Differentiated goods
CHIN 4.634*** 0.633* 0.802 5.078*** 0.872 1.867*** 9.186*** 2.017*** 3.770*
(9.69) (1.84) (1.63) (7.73) (1.23) (4.03) (5.46) (2.61) (1.80)
CHIN*(1‐DIR) 0.949* 0.100 0.824** 0.330 49.11 34.41
(1.82) (0.17) (2.38) (0.58) (1.44) (1.52)
CHIN*DIR 0.472 1.029** 0.896 2.077*** 2.057*** 3.890*
(1.02) (1.99) (0.88) (4.39) (2.61) (1.85)
Trade creation (%)
CHIN 1.540 0.209 0.265 1.611 0.275 0.590 0.302 0.0663 0.124
CHIN*(1‐DIR) 0.314 0.0330 0.260 0.104 1.626 1.137
CHIN*DIR 0.156 0.340 0.282 0.656 0.0676 0.128
Tariff equivalent (%)
CHIN 0.383 0.0523 0.0662 0.400 0.0687 0.147 0.0754 0.0166 0.0310
CHIN*(1‐DIR) 0.0784 0.00827 0.0649 0.0260 0.403 0.283
CHIN*DIR 0.0390 0.0850 0.0706 0.164 0.0169 0.0319
1980 1990 2000
N=2114, N=2127, N=2377 in 1980 for exchange‐traded goods, referenced‐priced goods, and differentiated goods, N=2372, N=2377, N=2533 in 1990, and N=2741, N=2914, N=3025 in 2000, respectively. All regressions include the full list of
covariates as shown in Table 1, and a constant (all omitted). FE‐OLS and FE‐PML include country dummies. Observations clustered by (undirectional) country‐pair. Robust t statistics in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. Trade creation (%) and ad valorem tariff equivalents (%) evaluated at the respective sample means. Elasticity of substitution is twenty, fiveteen, and five for exchange‐traded, reference‐priced, and differentiated 
goods, respectively.
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Table 8: Strong versus weak network link in aggregate trade (Details to Table 3)
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Table 9: Strong versus weak network link in different commodity groups (Details to Table 4)
34
C Details to other migrant networks (Figure 2)
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
MIG 72.71* 140.0*** 157.4*** 26.60 279.3*** 16.66
(1.65) (8.44) (2.92) (0.19) (2.60) (0.59)
MIG*(1‐DIR) ‐20272.3 36489.4** 28891.1* ‐116595.0* 188388.8 ‐3927.4
(‐0.61) (2.48) (1.84) (‐1.84) (1.48) (‐0.06)
MIG*DIR 67.09 153.2*** 177.9*** ‐58.88 304.6*** 14.19
(1.52) (8.19) (3.17) (‐0.40) (2.81) (0.30)
Trade creation (%)
MIG 0.178 0.183 0.150 0.0201 0.156 0.0419
MIG*(1‐DIR) ‐39.07 60.96 31.66 ‐58.54 185.9 ‐9.411
MIG*DIR 0.164 0.200 0.170 ‐0.0444 0.170 0.0357
Tariff equivalent (%)
MIG 0.0254 0.0261 0.0214 0.00287 0.0222 0.00599
MIG*(1‐DIR) ‐7.079 6.799 3.929 ‐12.58 15.01 ‐1.412
MIG*DIR 0.0234 0.0286 0.0242 ‐0.00635 0.0243 0.00510
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
MIG ‐537.6*** 72.60 191.7** 53.49*** ‐3.474 362.8***
(‐6.49) (0.30) (1.99) (3.29) (‐0.22) (13.23)
MIG*(1‐DIR) 1497948.4 334190.4** 35113.3 7731.8 ‐277.4 61897.8***
(0.58) (2.38) (0.82) (0.93) (‐0.31) (5.67)
MIG*DIR ‐382.7 231.0 201.2** 61.01*** ‐4.590 393.4***
(‐0.06) (0.90) (2.07) (5.48) (‐0.30) (14.36)
Trade creation (%)
MIG ‐0.614 0.0488 0.230 0.150 ‐0.0304 0.486
MIG*(1‐DIR) 2.80344e+09 845.1 52.35 24.15 ‐2.403 128.5
MIG*DIR ‐0.437 0.155 0.242 0.171 ‐0.0402 0.527
Tariff equivalent (%)
MIG ‐0.0879 0.00697 0.0328 0.0214 ‐0.00435 0.0692
MIG*(1‐DIR) 245.0 32.09 6.015 3.090 ‐0.347 11.81
MIG*DIR ‐0.0626 0.0222 0.0345 0.0244 ‐0.00575 0.0750
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
MIG 38.49*** 92.07 ‐10.16* 113.3*** 21.78 ‐2.021
(3.05) (0.96) (‐1.70) (3.72) (0.55) (‐0.18)
MIG*(1‐DIR) ‐5395.6** ‐173799.2*** ‐4600.0 ‐13007.8** 63118.3 39988.9***
(‐2.24) (‐3.23) (‐1.45) (‐2.10) (1.57) (4.95)
MIG*DIR 36.08*** 51.97 ‐10.80* 92.82*** 23.73 10.15
(2.86) (0.55) (‐1.78) (2.86) (0.59) (0.87)
Trade creation (%)
DZA ECU EGY ESP FINETH
BRA
CAN CHE CHL COL DEU DNK
ARG AUS AUT BEL BOL
MIG 0.118 0.0640 ‐0.0285 0.334 0.0197 ‐0.00348
MIG*(1‐DIR) ‐15.24 ‐70.11 ‐12.11 ‐31.84 76.83 99.16
MIG*DIR 0.111 0.0361 ‐0.0303 0.274 0.0214 0.0175
Tariff equivalent (%)
MIG 0.0169 0.00914 ‐0.00407 0.0477 0.00281 ‐0.000497
MIG*(1‐DIR) ‐2.362 ‐17.25 ‐1.844 ‐5.475 8.143 9.842
MIG*DIR 0.0158 0.00516 ‐0.00433 0.0391 0.00306 0.00250
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
MIG ‐7.372 9.719** 1614.1*** 86.08 7.188 253.7***
(‐0.53) (2.35) (3.09) (0.71) (0.04) (3.82)
MIG*(1‐DIR) 1071.8 233.5* ‐284870.3 ‐75510.0** ‐46917.5 97605.1***
(0.63) (1.68) (‐0.89) (‐2.06) (‐0.94) (2.60)
MIG*DIR ‐5.109 10.41** 1565.6*** 53.67 ‐29.45 296.3***
(‐0.36) (2.50) (2.99) (0.45) (‐0.17) (4.71)
Trade creation (%)
MIG ‐0.0299 0.153 0.544 0.121 0.00557 0.257
MIG*(1‐DIR) 4.441 3.737 ‐61.63 ‐65.32 ‐30.46 168.4
MIG*DIR ‐0.0207 0.164 0.528 0.0753 ‐0.0228 0.300
Tariff equivalent (%)
MIG ‐0.00427 0.0218 0.0775 0.0172 0.000795 0.0367
MIG*(1‐DIR) 0.621 0.524 ‐13.68 ‐15.13 ‐5.190 14.10
MIG*DIR ‐0.00296 0.0234 0.0752 0.0108 ‐0.00326 0.0428
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
MIG ‐20.52* 9.146* 51.68 ‐558.8 2452.4*** 1949.3***
(‐1.69) (1.80) (1.62) (‐1.44) (6.69) (3.08)
MIG*(1‐DIR) 196.8 ‐353.1 ‐3490.5 14744.0 2182238.5*** ‐2102390.7**
(0.20) (‐1.63) (‐0.27) (1.24) (5.90) (‐2.17)
MIG*DIR ‐20.22 9.516* 50.07 ‐556.6 2604.1*** 1464.7**
(‐1.63) (1.88) (1.59) (‐1.42) (7.19) (2.20)
Trade creation (%)
MIG ‐0.103 0.0773 0.0623 ‐0.986 0.384 0.455
MIG*(1‐DIR) 0.992 ‐2.940 ‐4.116 29.89 2917.1 ‐99.25
MIG*DIR ‐0.101 0.0804 0.0603 ‐0.982 0.407 0.341
Tariff equivalent (%)
MIG ‐0.0147 0.0110 0.00889 ‐0.142 0.0547 0.0648
MIG*(1‐DIR) 0.141 ‐0.426 ‐0.601 3.736 48.67 ‐69.87
MIG*DIR ‐0.0145 0.0115 0.00861 ‐0.141 0.0581 0.0487
IDN IND IRL IRN
Dependent variable: Aggregate trade. Estimation method: Fixed‐effect PML. N=3259 in all regressions. All regressions include the full list of covariates as shown in Table 1, a dummy for common colonizer, 
and a set of country dummies. Observations clustered by (undirectional) country‐pair. Robust t statistics in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Trade 
creation (%) and ad valorem tariff equivalents (%) evaluated at the respective sample means. Elasticity of substitution is eight.
HKG
ISL ISR
GHA HUNFRA GBR GRC
35
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
MIG 8.101 316.6** 634.5*** ‐0.628 ‐695.0** ‐825.0
(0.94) (2.09) (5.57) (‐0.01) (‐2.57) (‐0.22)
MIG*(1‐DIR) ‐2266.8* 2885646.7* 235378.1 12987.8 ‐795301.7* 1158791.7**
(‐1.77) (1.81) (1.05) (0.35) (‐1.88) (2.14)
MIG*DIR ‐1.026 2880.9* 662.2*** 10.87 ‐758.7*** ‐810.5
(‐0.10) (1.95) (5.65) (0.11) (‐2.77) (‐0.22)
LBYITA JPN KEN KOR KWT
Trade creation (%)
MIG 0.0606 0.321 0.212 ‐0.00108 ‐0.154 ‐0.0541
MIG*(1‐DIR) ‐15.60 4. 81877e+14 119.6 25.09 ‐82.93 113.9
MIG*DIR ‐0.00767 2.959 0.222 0.0187 ‐0.169 ‐0.0532
Tariff equivalent (%)
MIG 0.00866 0.0458 0.0303 ‐0.000155 ‐0.0221 ‐0.00773
MIG*(1‐DIR) ‐2.423 417.2 11.24 3.198 ‐25.26 10.86
MIG*DIR ‐0.00110 0.417 0.0316 0.00268 ‐0.0241 ‐0.00760
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
MIG 98 86*** 41 25*** ‐0 165 164 5 39 52 247 1***
MAR MEX MYS NGA NLD NOR
. . . . . .
(4.00) (5.83) (‐0.04) (0.76) (0.94) (4.03)
MIG*(1‐DIR) 1699.5 ‐222.8 619.5 ‐19237.2 ‐21607.3 109563.3***
(1.45) (‐0.35) (0.72) (‐0.24) (‐1.14) (14.53)
MIG*DIR 100.2*** 40.95*** 0.112 156.8 20.53 276.1***
(3.99) (5.69) (0.03) (0.72) (0.48) (4.52)
Trade creation (%)
MIG 0.656 0.169 ‐0.000853 0.169 0.0841 0.206
MIG*(1‐DIR) 11.90 ‐0.910 3.254 ‐17.88 ‐36.84 149.2
MIG*DIR 0.665 0.168 0.000581 0.161 0.0437 0.230
Tariff equivalent (%)
MIG 0.0934 0.0242 ‐0.000122 0.0241 0.0120 0.0294
MIG*(1‐DIR) 1.606 ‐0.131 0.457 ‐2.815 ‐6.565 13.04
MIG*DIR 0.0947 0.0240 0.0000829 0.0229 0.00624 0.0329
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
MIG 106.6*** 57.32*** 441.6*** 38.15 140.4*** 71.48***
(9.38) (3.29) (3.37) (1.64) (2.83) (3.20)
MIG*(1‐DIR) 3681.9 ‐4013.2 ‐261755.5* ‐4827.5 ‐7911.7 ‐4227.9**
(0.18) (‐1.56) (‐1.75) (‐1.33) (‐1.02) (‐2.12)
MIG*DIR 107.1*** 54.25*** 330.7** 30.70 130.4*** 66.52***
(8.77) (3.10) (2.54) (1.32) (2.61) (2.98)
Trade creation (%)
PER PHL POL PRTNZL PAK
   
MIG 0.131 0.243 0.432 0.192 0.552 0.214
MIG*(1‐DIR) 4.629 ‐15.61 ‐92.24 ‐21.55 ‐26.69 ‐11.90
MIG*DIR 0.132 0.230 0.323 0.154 0.513 0.199
Tariff equivalent (%)
MIG 0.0187 0.0346 0.0616 0.0274 0.0787 0.0306
MIG*(1‐DIR) 0.646 ‐2.425 ‐36.51 ‐3.468 ‐4.436 ‐1.810
MIG*DIR 0.0188 0.0328 0.0461 0.0221 0.0731 0.0285
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
MIG 104.3** ‐4253.8* 53.79 0.237 152.9*** ‐86.29
SWE THASDN SGPPRY SAU
(2.50) (‐1.85) (1.15) (0.00) (3.31) (‐1.38)
MIG*(1‐DIR) ‐8971.8 ‐1 6021445.5** ‐112495.9* 99205.9** 40961.8*** 87286.5
(‐0.11) (‐2.23) (‐1.84) (2.17) (4.05) (1.54)
MIG*DIR 103.2** ‐5232.5** 49.38 19.16 179.6*** ‐56.17
(2.40) (‐2.23) (1.08) (0.21) (3.78) (‐0.86)
Trade creation (%)
MIG 0.0616 ‐0.601 0.0236 0.000125 0.242 ‐0.120
MIG*(1‐DIR) ‐5.160 ‐100.00 ‐38.97 68.81 91.11 236.5
MIG*DIR 0.0610 ‐0.739 0.0217 0.0101 0.284 ‐0.0781
Tariff equivalent (%)
MIG 0.00880 ‐0.0862 0.00337 0.0000179 0.0345 ‐0.0171
MIG*(1 DIR) 0 757 324 5 7 054 7 480 9 253 17 33‐ ‐ . ‐ . ‐ . . . .
MIG*DIR 0.00871 ‐0.106 0.00310 0.00144 0.0406 ‐0.0112
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
MIG 324.7*** 61.83*** ‐157.5* ‐197.8*** 749.2*** 155.0
(7.40) (5.70) (‐1.70) (‐5.03) (3.07) (1.62)
MIG*(1‐DIR) ‐73522.3*** ‐2402.9 ‐5708.7 ‐3471.1 15129.9 61571.4***
(‐2.68) (‐1.51) (‐0.02) (‐0.40) (0.07) (6.01)
MIG*DIR 307.2*** 57.36*** ‐158.1* ‐205.3*** 752.9*** 187.5*
(6.91) (5.17) (‐1.65) (‐4.53) (3.09) (1.93)
Trade creation (%)
TUN TUR URY USA VEN ZAF
MIG 0.333 0.412 ‐0.0571 ‐0.740 0.362 0.225
MIG*(1‐DIR) ‐52.94 ‐14.75 ‐2.049 ‐12.22 7.564 144.0
MIG*DIR 0.315 0.382 ‐0.0573 ‐0.768 0.363 0.272
Tariff equivalent (%)
MIG 0.0475 0.0587 ‐0.00816 ‐0.106 0.0516 0.0321
MIG*(1‐DIR) ‐10.77 ‐2.280 ‐0.296 ‐1.862 1.042 12.75
MIG*DIR 0.0450 0.0544 ‐0.00819 ‐0.110 0.0518 0.0388
Dependent variable: Aggregate trade. Estimation method: Fixed‐effect PML. N=3259 in all regressions. All regressions include the full list of covariates as shown in Table 1, a dummy for common colonizer, 
and a set of country dummies. Observations clustered by (undirectional) country‐pair. Robust t statistics in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Trade 
creation (%) and ad valorem tariff equivalents (%) evaluated at the respective sample means. Elasticity of substitution is eight.
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